Orlando Edney v. C. Haliburton by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-2-2016 
Orlando Edney v. C. Haliburton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Orlando Edney v. C. Haliburton" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 736. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/736 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-2431 
____________ 
 
ORLANDO EDNEY, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
C. HALIBURTON, MAIL ROOM OFFICER; 
 JOHN DELANEY, WARDEN DETENTION CENTER; 
 LOUIS GIORLA, COMMISSIONER OF PP’S; 
 MICHAEL NUTTER, MAYOR OF PHILADELPHIA 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-14-cv-01095) 
District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr.       
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 1, 2016 
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 2, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Orlando Edney appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing 
his amended complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
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 Edney, a pretrial detainee facing charges in the Philadelphia County Court of 
Common Pleas, filed an in forma pauperis civil rights action in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against former City of Philadelphia Mayor 
Michael Nutter, Prison Commissioner Louis Giorla, Warden John Delaney, and mail 
room Officer C. Haliburton.  Edney alleged that his constitutional rights were violated 
when Haliburton tampered with his regular mail by removing and destroying a photocopy 
of his codefendant Benjamin Collier’s identification card (“ID card”), which Collier had 
attached to his notarized statement.  Although the ID card was confiscated, the statement 
itself, which was apparently offered to exonerate Edney, was properly delivered by prison 
authorities to Edney.1  Collier alleged in his complaint that the removal and destruction of 
the ID card photocopy will do irreparable damage to his defense of innocence.  In an 
order entered on December 19, 2014, the District Court dismissed the amended 
complaint, concluding that it did not state an actionable constitutional violation as 
required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 Edney appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our Clerk granted 
him leave to proceed in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal could be 
summarily dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or that the Court could summarily 
affirm under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  After Edney submitted argument 
in support of his appeal, the Clerk concluded that the appeal should proceed to briefing 
and directed the parties to specifically address whether Edney had stated a claim of denial 
                                                                
1 In this affidavit, Collier stated that: “Orlando Edney had no knowledge that 7418 Medrick Place was not my place 
of residence and that I Benjamin Collier open[ed] the door for his entry to utilize the bathroom, which he was 
doing at the time officers arrived.” 
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of access to the courts, pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996).  In his Informal Brief, Edney argues that dismissal of 
his complaint was in error because Officer C. Haliburton tampered with and confiscated a 
“Legal Binding Document,” that the document -- an ID card photocopy -- did not present 
a security risk, and that he has suffered emotional distress as a result of the confiscation.  
In pertinent part, the appellees in their brief concede that nominal damages are available 
for First Amendment violations, but note that Edney has not yet been tried and thus has 
suffered no actual harm. 
 We will affirm.  We exercise plenary review over a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.  See 
Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001).  We “are free” to affirm the 
judgment “on any basis which finds support in the record.”  Bernitsky v. United States, 
620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980).  Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where the 
plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility 
standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  Conclusory allegations are insufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
 Prisoners have a right of access to the courts, Lewis, 518 U.S. 343; Bounds v. 
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).  This right prohibits active interference with a prisoner’s 
preparation or filing of legal documents and ensures a reasonably adequate opportunity to 
present violations of fundamental constitutional rights.  Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-51.  The 
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right to present a defense of innocence is one of those rights, but a violation is only 
established where the prisoner shows that he was actually injured, that is, where he shows 
that he was actually hindered in his efforts to pursue a legal claim, id. at 351.  An actual 
injury is shown only where an arguable claim is lost, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 
403, 415 (2002).  If Edney has not yet been tried and convicted, his claim of innocence 
has not yet been lost.  “The ripeness doctrine determines ‘whether a party has brought an 
action prematurely, and counsels abstention until such time as a dispute is sufficiently 
concrete to satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of the doctrine.’”  
Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 580 
F.3d 185, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 433 (3d 
Cir. 2003)).  A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests on some contingent future 
event, as does Edney’s claim.  Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998).  In that 
he has not yet been tried and convicted, Edney’s access to the courts claim involving a 
defense of innocence cannot survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss.2   
 To the extent that Edney merely alleged that he suffered emotional harm from the 
defendants’ destruction of his copy of Collier’s photo ID card, which he cannot replace 
because Collier is deceased, the Prison Litigation Reform Act prohibits recovery of 
damages for mental and emotional injuries absent a showing of physical injury.  42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535-36 (3d Cir. 2003) (requiring 
more than de minimis physical injury as predicate to allegation of emotional injury).  In 
                                                                
2 In any event, as the appellees have pointed out, the loss of the ID card should not affect 
Edney’s defense because a notarized document is self-authenticating, Pa. R. Evid. 902(8).  
Collier’s statement was notarized and thus the ID card is unnecessary. 
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addition, a prisoner’s right to receive and send mail can be restricted for legitimate 
penological reasons.  See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989); Turner v. 
Safley, 481 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).  An isolated incident of mail tampering is generally 
insufficient to state a First Amendment violation, see, e.g., Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 
351 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n isolated incident of mail tampering is usually insufficient to 
establish a constitutional violation.”).  Moreover, Edney’s assertion that his possession of 
someone else’s photo ID does not pose a security risk is implausible and thus insufficient 
to survive a motion to dismiss, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
Edney’s amended complaint.
